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&

Data Privacy: Drawbacks, Benefits,
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ALEXANDER J. PANTOS*
INTRODUCTION

National data privacy regimes are quickly gaining traction and

ubiquity around the globe. Moving forward, countries will face a range
of difficult decisions surrounding how best to engage internationally in
cross border data flow, particularly in the context of personal
information (PI).

This article takes a bird's-eye view of the current state of data
privacy regimes in the world's four highest GDP regions. In part, this
article hopes to provide a succinct analysis of these data privacy
regimes, with a focus on the balance they strike between granting
individuals rights in their data and placing responsibilities on
businesses that deal with PI. Analyzing the world's most economically
active countries provides an opportunity to highlight the substantial
benefits that data privacy regimes can provide the world's citizens while
balancing these benefits against the potential negative economic impact
of data privacy regimes. This proposition motivated this article's choice
of regions to survey.

Section I provides an overview of the current state of data privacy
legislation and regulation in the United States, China, Japan, and the
European Union. Section II outlines the drawbacks to some of the
common themes that emerge from these surprisingly similar regulatory
frameworks. Section III explores the benefits data privacy regimes offer
to individuals. Section IV proposes potential solutions to this emerging
global governance conundrum.

* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2021. I would like to
thank Professor Michael Mattioli for his guidance in writing this article; the Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies team for their support and editorial work; and Alexa
Wilson for her patience, advice, and willingness to look over the drafts that lead to this
piece. Any remaining errors are my own.
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I. SURVEY OF SELECT CURRENT GLOBAL DATA PRIVACY REGIMES

This section focuses on major national players in the global data
privacy scheme, specifically those countries with the world's four largest
GDPs, 1 whose data privacy regimes vary in important ways.

United States
The United States federalist system of government creates unique
challenges in data privacy regulation. This subsection outlines privacy
laws at the federal level and in California to highlight the relevant
features of each and illustrate the complex, interconnected nature of
United States data privacy governance.
FederalPrivacy Law Patchwork
The United States (US) does not have a comprehensive federal
framework for private data governance. 2 The closest approximation at
the federal level is a variety of modality-focused, content-focused, and
child-safety-focused laws passed throughout the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries.

3

Modality-focused laws limit the way commercial entities can contact
consumers using specific modes of communication. 4 For example, the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) proscribes commercial
autodialing of any emergency numbers, guest rooms at facilities with
sensitive clientele like retirement homes and hospitals, and cellular
phones. 5 The Controlling the Attack of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM) focuses instead on the notorious spam
email and sets guidelines for companies using email to communicate
with private individuals. 6 The congressional findings in CAN-SPAM
focus on the efficiency-draining effects spam email has on commerce and
the potential for spam emails to contain "vulgar or pornographic"
content that may be offensive to some email users. 7 Section 7704 of

CAN-SPAM provides, in part, that commercial mass-mailers may not
1. GDP (Current US$), THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
ny.gdp.mktp.cd?most recent valuedesc=true (Last Visited Oct. 9, 2019).
2. See Stuart L. Pardau, The CaliforniaConsumer Privacy Act: Towards a EuropeanStyle Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH L. & POL'Y 68, 73-74 (2018).
3. Id. at 73-84.
4. Id. at 74.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7701(a)(2), (5) (West 2019).

HOW THE WORLD'S LARGEST ECONOMIES REGULATE DATA PRIVACY

269

use false or misleading information in subject lines, 8 and must include
mechanisms for email recipients to opt out of future emails. 9 Section
7703 imposes criminal punishment for violations by identifying CANSPAM as an addition to a statute criminalizing fraud and related
activity in email communications. 10
Content-focused privacy laws "seek to regulate privacy in the
context of specific types of data or industries." The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects individuals' health
information by establishing national standards for privacy and security
measures for "covered entities" 12 that hold and transfer health data. 13
In light of the strong public policy interests in favor of facilitating the
transfer of such data between medical care and research institutions,14
HIPAA also standardizes the format covered entities use to store health
information to make transfers more efficient. 15 The Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) and its subsequent amendments (namely, the
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 and the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003)16 "promote[] the accuracy,
fairness, and privacy of information in the files of consumer reporting
agencies."

17

In response to the often opaque practices of consumer

reporting agencies, 18 the FCRA focuses on consumers' rights in relation
to the information agencies hold about them, including the right to be
told if your information has been used against you, the right to know
what is in your credit file, and the right to dispute inaccurate or
incomplete information. 19

8. Id. § 7704(a)(2).
9. Id. § 7704(a)(3)-(4).
10. Id. § 7703(b)(1); see generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 1037 (West 2019) (authorizing
punishment in the form of fines, prison time, and civil forfeiture for violation of the act).
11. Pardau, supra note 2, at 79.
12. MEDPRIVACY, GUIDE TO MEDICAL PRIVACY AND HIPAA § 200 (Joan M. Flynn ed.)
(2015), 2002 WL 33833724 ("[A]ny health plan, health care provider or clearinghouse that
electronically transmits or stores personal health information, including entities' business
associates.").
13. Id.
14. See Michael Mattioli, The Data-PoolingProblem, 1 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 179, 17982 (2017) (exploring the use and transfer of big data in the context of cancer research).
15. MEDPRIVACY, supra note 12.
16. Pardau, supra note 2, at 79.
17. FED. TRADE

COMM'N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT

REPORTING ACT, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf.
18. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (advocating for increased
procedural due process in disputes between consumers and credit reporting agencies).
19. MEDPRIVACY, supra note 12.
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The realm of child-safety-focused federal laws is dominated by the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). 20 COPPA requires

verifiable parental consent before online data collectors can collect, use,
or distribute children's information. 21 Passed in 1998, COPPA aims to
protect society's most vulnerable, and often most gullible, citizens by
imposing criminal penalties on website owners who do not comply.22
Their narrow scope is the greatest strength and greatest weakness
of modality-, content-, and child-safety-focused laws. These laws
regulate their respective areas of impact with specificity and efficacy
but leave consumers' information open to misuse in areas that fall
outside their reach. Notably, of the US federal laws discussed in this
note, only COPPA covers data contained within or obtained from social
media platforms and online search engines, which are arguably the
most notorious data repositories for modern internet users. This lack of
nationwide regulation could be chalked up to the slow-moving nature of
the federal legislature. It also may be, however, that the federal
government is counting on the US's federalist structure to shore up any
leaks in the protection of citizens' privacy rights by assuming that states
will enact such laws themselves. Such laws could account for the specific
challenges each state's citizens face with respect to data privacy and
could more accurately reflect each state's citizens' local values
surrounding the collection and use of their data.
California
A notable example of this proposition is the state of California's
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which went into effect in 2020 and
closely mirrors the European Union's General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). The CCPA aims to give California's citizens more
control over the personal data that businesses collect about them. 23
While the CCPA limits its reach to large businesses 24 that collect and

20. Pardau, supra note 2, at 82.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105 (West 2018).
24. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(c) (West 2018) defines "business" as '[a] [company] . ..
that collects consumers' private information, . . . determines the purpose and means of the
processing of consumers' personal information, [and] that does business in the State of
California .... " To fall under the regulation's purview, the businesses also must either
have income of $25,000,000 annually; receive information from at least 50,000 consumers,
households or devices; or derive 50% or more of its annual revenue from selling
consumers' data. Id.
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deal in PI,25 it is still far broader and more comprehensive than the US
piecemeal federal privacy regulations. 26
The CCPA categorizes businesses as either data collectors or data
sellers and establishes citizens' rights and businesses' responsibilities
for each category. 27 In either context, consumers are granted the right to
request that companies delete their personal data, and businesses are
required to delete-and instruct service providers to delete-the data
upon receipt of a "verifiable consumer request." 28
Consumers have the right to direct businesses that sell data not to
sell their PI; this is known in the CCPA as "the right to opt-out." 29
Businesses that sell data have concurrent responsibilities to disclose to
consumers the fact that PI may be sold and inform consumers of their
right to opt out of having their PI sold.30 Additionally, these businesses
must provide a link on their websites labeled "Do Not Sell My Personal
Information" that provides a mechanism for consumers to opt out,3 1 and
they cannot sell PI if they have received direction from the consumer
not to. 32 Citizens have the right to request disclosure of a wide range of
information from businesses that sell their PI, including the categories
of PI collected and sold. 33 Businesses that sell data have the
responsibility to provide these disclosures free of charge within fortyfive days of receipt of a verified consumer request. 34
For data collection, consumers have a similar right to opt out, and
businesses have the responsibility to provide, at a minimum, a toll-free
telephone number and website address where consumers can exercise
this right. 35 Similar to businesses that sell data, businesses that collect
data have a responsibility to disclose information to consumers within
forty-five days of receipt of a verified consumer request, including: the
categories of information the business collects, to whom the business
communicates the information, and the business purpose of the data
collection. 36

25. Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1) (PI "means information that identifies, relates to, describes,
is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly,
with a particular consumer or household.").
26. See Pardau, supra note 2, at 89.
27. See generally Cal. Civ. Code. §§ 1798.100-.125 (West 2018).
28. Id. at § 1798.105(a), (c).
29. Id. at § 1798.120(a).
30. Id. at § 1798.120(b).
31. Id. at § 1798.135(a)(1).
32. Id. at § 1798.120(d).
33. Id. at § 1798.115(a).
34. Id. at § 1798.130(a)(2).
35. Id. at § 1798.130(a)(1).
36. Id. at § 1798.110(c).
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Mirroring the federal government's

COPPA, the CCPA provides

special protection for children. Businesses are not allowed to sell data
collected from children under thirteen-years-old without an express "opt
in" from a parent or guardian.37 For children thirteen-to-sixteen-yearsold, parent or guardian consent is not required, but an opt in must be
obtained from the children themselves. 38 While this may seem like a
small difference, businesses that must follow an opt-in, rather than an
opt-out, procedure are highly limited in their freedom to use information
collected from California's children.
Finally, the CCPA goes to great lengths not to step on the toes of the
federal government's existing privacy regimes.39 Specifically, in cases of
overlap with data covered by HIPPA and the FCRA, discussed above,
the CCPA explicitly does not apply. 40 This careful tailoring lends
credence to the argument that the federal government is planning its
own privacy regulations around the assumption that states will pick up
where the federal regulations leave off. As noted above, federal statutes
do not cover information collected by social media websites and search
engines. California, partially through its citizen ballot initiative
procedure, 41 looked to the values of its citizens to fill the gaps left by the
federal government. While not every state gives its citizens as much say
in legislative procedure, it stands to reason that other states, faced with
an increased focus on data collection and privacy concerns, will follow
suit. 42

China
In 2016, Xu Yuyu, a Chinese high school graduate preparing for
college, was swindled into giving around $1,400 to a scammer posing as

an education official.43 Two days later, Yuyu died from cardiac arrest,
which in the public's mind was tied to the anxiety she suffered following
the scammer's attack. 44 This event, coupled with a number of other
37. Id. at § 1798.120(c).
38. Id.
39. See Pardau, supra note 2, at 93.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 90-91.
42. See generally Forbes Tech. Council, How Will California's Consumer Privacy Law
Impact the Data Privacy Landscape?, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/20 18/08/20/how-will-californias-consumer-privacy-law-impact-the-dataprivacy-landscape/#4e656637e922 (2018).
43. Wei Sheng, One Year After GDPR, China Strengthens Personal Data Regulations,
Welcoming Dedicated Law, TECHNODE (June 19, 2019), https://technode.com/2019/06/19/
china-data-protections-law/ (2019).
44. Id.
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highly publicized data breaches, sparked national outrage over China's
lack of data privacy regulation. 45 The Chinese government responded in
the same year with the passage of the Cybersecurity Law (the Law). 46
Article 1 of the Law lays out its broad public policy goals; namely, to
"safeguard cyberspace sovereignty and national security, ... protect the
lawful rights and interests of citizens, . . . and promote the healthy

development of the informatization of the economy and society." 47
Historically, China has relied on its "Great Firewall" to control what
can and cannot be reached by end users within its borders. 48 The
Chinese government is aided in this process by its exclusive control over
Internet access providers (IAPs), all of which are connected to a "foreign
Internet backbone." 49 China's Internet infrastructure allows the
government to filter what information makes its way to end users based
on whitelists (websites that are expressly allowed), blacklists (websites
that are expressly disallowed), and keyword restrictions. 50
While the Great Firewall protects information coming to end users,
the Law looks to protect information collected from end users. The Law
applies to "network operators and businesses in critical sectors." 51
"Network operators" is a broad term under the Law, which applies to
network managers and owners of any group of computers or computer

systems that gather, transmit, and process data. 52 "Critical sectors" is
similarly broad, encompassing "communications, information services,
energy, transport, water, financial services, public services, and
electronic government services." 53
Putting these broad definitions to work, Article 37 of the Law
provides that network operators must store any PI collected in China
within the country's borders and must ask for permission before any
data is transferred out of the country. 54 The petitioning network
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Rogier Creemers et al., Translation: The Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic
of China (Effective June 1, 2017), NEW AMERICA: CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE (June 29,
2018),
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translationcybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/.
48. See Jyh-An Lee & Ching-Yi Liu, Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great Firewall:
The Law and Power of Internet Filtering in China, 13 MINN. J.L., SC'., & TECH. 129-34
(2012).
49. Id. at 133-34.
50. See id. at 131.
51. Jack Wagner, China's Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know, THE DIPLOMAT
(June 01, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-needto-know/.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Creemers et al., supra note 47.
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operator must show that the transfer is "truly necessary" and must
allow a number of Chinese state entities to perform a "security
assessment" to ensure proper cybersecurity measures are in place before
the operator can transmit the PI across the Chinese border. 55
The Law, by itself, is primarily an instrument to set out policy goals
and broad privacy requirements. 56 To supplement the Law, China's
National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee
published TC260, or the Personal Information Security Specification
(the Standard), "which covers the collection, storage, use, sharing,
transfer, and disclosure of personal information." 57 The Standard covers
a lot of ground and, like the CCPA, provides private individuals with a
wide range of rights, and businesses with a wide range of
responsibilities. 58 Thematically, the Standard can be broken down into
three main categories: (1) requirements for explicit consent from datacollection subjects, (2) requirements for disclosing what the Standard
refers to as "PI Controllers," 59 and (3) requirements for privacy security
infrastructure and personnel. 60
The Standard's explicit consent requirement begins at collection and
mandates that PI controllers must acquire separate consent each time
they use the individual's PI after collection. 61 To illustrate, imagine a
Chinese company uses PI to create materials that advertisers can use to
supplement targeted advertising. At the point of collection, the company
must obtain explicit consent from the data subject. If the company
decides to share the data with an ad agency, the company must obtain
the subject's separate, explicit consent. Down the road, if the company
decides to use PI to create a new algorithm to provide feedback to their
advertiser clients on the impacts of their advertisements, the company
must obtain the subject's separate consent.
At each step in the consent process, PI controllers must provide a
range of information about the natures and purposes of their data
collection and retention. 62 For example, when collecting PI, the PI
controller must disclose to the individual "the respective types of the PI
55. Id.
56. Sheng, supra note 43.
57. Id.
58. See generally Mingli Shi et al., Translation: China's Personal Information Security
Specification,

NEW

AMERICA:

CYBERSECURITY

INITIATIVE

(Feb.

8,

2019),

https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinaspersonal-information-security-specification/.
59. Id. art. 3.4("An organization or individual that has the authority to determine the
purposes and/or methods of the processing of PI").

60. See generally id.
61. Id. art. 5.3.
62. See generally id.
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collected[;] .

.

. the rules of collecting and using the PI (e.g. purpose of

collection and use; manner and frequency of collection; storage location;
storage period; [the controller's] data security capabilities; information
related to sharing, transferring, and public disclosure; etc.)." 63 The PI
controller may only obtain express consent after disclosing this
information to the individual.64
The Standard's infrastructure requirements include numerous
triggers

for

performing

Personal

Assessments 65 and provisions

Information

Security

Impact

that require certain PI controllers

operating in China to appoint a PI protection officer and create a PI

protection division. 66 The PI protection officer and division are
necessary if the PI controller's "main business involves the processing of
PI and the number of employees exceeds 200" or "[the PI controller]
[p]rocesses PI of more than 500,000 people or expects to process PI of
more than 500,000 people within 12 months." 67 The Standard requires
assessments when any new law or regulation is passed that bears on the
PI controller's activities; when the PI controller's "business model,

information system, or operational environment" changes; and in the
event of any "major" security breaches. 68
Japan

Japan recently espoused the principle of "Data Free Flow with
Trust." 69 Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, gave a speech at the
World Economic Forum's annual meeting in early 2019 highlighting his
vision for discussions of data-based governance at the June 2019 G20
summit. 70

The

prime

minister

emphasized

the

ever-increasing

importance of data in the global economy and called for international
agreement and data governance based on protections for privacy data

63. Id. art. 5.3.
64. Id.
65. Id. art. 3.8: ("A process to evaluate: the degree to which PI processing complies
with laws and regulations; whether there are any risks of damaging the lawful rights and
interests of PI subjects; and how effective various measures are to protect PI subjects.").
66. Id. art. 7.1(d).
67. Id. art. 10.1(c).
68. Id. art. 10.2(c).
69. See NIGEL CORY ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR "DATA FREE FLOW WITH

TRUST" 2 (Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. ed., 2019), https://itiforg/publications/2019/
05/27/principles-and-policies-data-free-flow-trust.
70. Shinzo Abe, 'Defeatism About Japan is Now Defeated': Read Abe's Davos Speech in
Full, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/abespeech-transcript/.
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and the free

flow of anonymous,

societally-useful

data

to fuel

innovation. 71
Japan's Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI)
currently controls the country's data privacy laws. 72 The APPI's purpose

mirrors Prime Minister Abe's policy goals, explicitly balancing the goal
of "protect[ing] an individual's rights and interests [in their PI]" with
"the utility of personal information including that the proper and
effective application of personal information contributes to the creation
of new industries and the realization of a vibrant economic society and
an enriched quality of life for the people of Japan." 73
Similar to China's Standard, the APPI mandates that a "personal
information handling business operator" 74 must specify and disclose a
"utilization purpose"-in other words, what it uses an individual's PI
for-when handling PI.75 Consent must be acquired pre-collection if the
operator is collecting "special care-required" 76 personal information. 77 In
changing the utilization purpose, the operator must take care not to
alter the purpose so much that it falls outside of the utilization purpose
stated before consent was obtained, 78 and must obtain consent again if
the new purpose falls outside of the original scope of consent given. 79
As with California's CCPA and China's Law and Standard, the
APPI applies to business operators that handle the data of individuals
in Japan regardless of whether the business has a physical presence in
Japan. 80 However, unlike the CCPA and the Standard, the APPI does
not include any restrictions based on the size of the business or the
amount of personal data collected. 81 When operators want to transfer

71. Id.
72. Andrada Coos, Data Protection in Japan: All You Need to Know About APPI,
ENDPOINT PROTECTOR (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.endpointprotector.com/blog/dataprotection-in-j apan-appi/.
73. Kojin joho no hogo ni kansuru horitsu [Act on the Protection of Personal
Information (APPI)], Law No. 51 of 2016, art. 1 (Japan), translated by Pers. Info. Prot.
Comm'n (2016).
74. Id. art. 2(5) ("a person providing a personal information database etc. for use in
business").
75. Id. art. 15(1).
76. Id. art. 2(3) ('personal information comprising a principal's race, creed, social
status, medical history, criminal record, fact of having suffered damage by a crime, or
other descriptions etc. prescribed by cabinet order as those of which the handling requires
special care so as not to cause unfair discrimination, prejudice or other disadvantages to
the principal.").
77. Id. at art. 17(2).
78. Id. art. 15(2).
79. Id. art. 16(2).
80. Coos, supra note 72.
81. Id.

HOW THE WORLD'S LARGEST ECONOMIES REGULATE DATA PRIVACY 277

data to a third party located within Japan's borders, they must obtain
separate consent from the data subject for the transfer. 82 When
operators want to transfer data to third parties located outside Japan's
borders, the operator must ensure that the third party has "a personal
information protection system recognized to have equivalent standards
to that in Japan .... "83 This requirement likely has a twofold purpose.
First, on its face, the provision aims to protect Japanese citizens' PI

after it leaves the hands of Japanese operators. However, less obviously,
Japan likely intends this provision to act as an incentive to foreign
countries and encourage them to follow its own footsteps by enacting
similar laws and regulations around PI protection. Again, this mirrors
Prime Minister Abe's goal of "Data Free Flow with Trust."
For data subjects, the APPI creates a number of rights concerning

personal data. For example, a data subject can request that an operator
disclose any personal data it has retained about the subject. 84 Upon
review, a data subject can demand corrections for any information the
operator holds that the subject determines is inaccurate, 85 withdraw
consent for the retention of personal data at any time, and demand
deletion.86 If the operator does not meet any of these demands within a
two-week window, the APPI creates a cause of action that allows data
subjects to bring suit against offending operators. 87
European Union

.

The EU's new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
went into effect on May 25, 2018, has prompted a wide range of praise,
criticism, and analysis. The stated purpose of the GDPR is to "protect[]
.. fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular
their right to the protection of personal data." 88 The GDPR has a wide
scope and applies to broadly-defined "personal data" 89 that is processed
by controllers relating to offering goods and services to-or monitoring
the behavior of-EU citizens. 90 The GDPR, like California's CCPA,

82. APPI, art. 23(1).
83. Id. art. 24.
84. Id. at art. 28(1).
85. Id. at art. 29(1).
86. See id. art. 30(1).
87. Id. art. 34(1).
88. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32.
89. Id. at 33 ("[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
... such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one
or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity of that natural person.").
90. Id.
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China's Law and Standard, and Japan's APPI, applies explicitly to any
controller who processes PI obtained from EU citizens, whether the
controller has a physical presence in the EU or not. 91
In Article 6, the GDPR lays out six specific instances in which PI
processing can be lawful: (1) when the data subject has given consent to
the processing for a specific purpose or purposes; (2) when processing is

necessary pursuant to a contract between the processor and the data
subject; (3) when the controller is under a legal obligation to process the
PI; (4) when the PI must be processed to protect the life or safety of the
data subject; (5) when the processing is "necessary for the performance
of a task carried out in the public interest" or by an official with lawful
authority; and (6) where the processing is necessary for the controller to
pursue "legitimate interests" as balanced against the rights of the data
subject.92
The GDPR provides a number of rights for data subjects. Chapter
III is dedicated solely to laying out these enumerated rights and the
modalities for exercising them. These enumerated rights include the
right to transparency in information about PI processing, 93 the right of a
data subject to receive and review information that has been collected
about them, 94 the right to demand correction of inaccurate information
in data collected, 95 and the "right to be forgotten," or, in other words, the
right to demand that a company holding an individual's PI delete that
information. 96
Along with all the data privacy regimes reviewed in this note, the
GDPR places a range of responsibilities on those processing PI. The
regulation requires that controllers have "appropriate" privacy security
measures in place to protect processed PI,97 but it is important to note

that individual companies can comply with the GDPR even if their
country of origin does not have privacy laws similar to the GDPR in
place. Article 7 describes the contours of the GDPR's definition of
"consent." 98 In particular, consent must be "as easy to withdraw as to
give" and, when consent is given in a written document, the provisions
dealing with consent must be separated from other provisions and
presented in "clear and plain language." 99 Article 30 requires that
91. Id.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id. at 39.
94. Id. at 40.
95. Id. at 43.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 48.
98. Abigayle Erickson, Comparative Analysis of the EU's GDPR and Brazil's LGPD:
Enforcement Challenges with the LGPD, 44 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 859, 880 (2019).
99. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37.
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controllers "maintain a record of processing activities under its
responsibility."100 If controllers use a new technology to process PI, they
must conduct a "data protection impact assessment," and, if that
assessment shows that security risk to PI is high, the controller must
consult with the "supervisory authority" before moving forward with
processing. 101
The GDPR, China's Law and Standard, Japan's APPI, and
California's CPPA espouse many of the same principles and work
similarly to obtain their stated policy goals. All four regulations
recognize consumers' rights to control and access their personal data;
place heavy responsibilities on entities in the business of collecting,
processing, and selling PI; and implement vehicles for their respective
governmental agencies to establish best practices in security for the
retention and transfer of PI.
II.

COMMON DRAWBACKS

Each of the privacy regimes discussed (with the exception of the US
federal data privacy regime, or lack thereof) unquestionably provides
private citizens with more protection over their PI. By moving beyond

the modality-, content-, and child-safety-focused laws that characterize
the US federal PI privacy regime, the CCPA, China's Law and
Standard, the APPI, and the GDPR each define data collectors, brokers,
and processors broadly enough to catch almost any PI-related business
activities. However, this wide net may come with considerable costs to
companies that participate in and rely on smooth, readily available
transborder data flow. The increasing importance of Big Data in
business will force countries to continue attempting to balance their
legitimate concerns about their citizens' safety and privacy with
encouraging business efficiency, growth, and innovation in their
economies.

This section explores the drawbacks associated with four common
themes in the data privacy regimes discussed above: data localization
requirements, requirements for continual consumer consent, the wide
reach of internationally operable data laws, and the prolific granting of
consumer rights in PI.

100. Id. at 50.
101. Id. at 53-54.
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Data Localization
Data localization is the practice of "confin[ing] data within a
country's borders ....

" 102 Of the regulations within the scope of this

note, only China's Law and Standard explicitly require data
localization.1 03 However, the infrastructure requirements of both the
GDPR and the APPI could lead to increased data localization in those
jurisdictions.
Data localization proponents generally claim that the practice
ensures increased government control over the privacy and security
measures used to protect citizens' PI. 104 Further, data localization
policies allow sovereign bodies to provide protection that reflects their
constituencies' values, rather than leaving the protection of their
citizens' PI up to the privacy policies of businesses across the world who
collect, analyze, and sell data.
Unfortunately, due to the fundamental nature of data, data
localization may not actually provide the security benefits its
proponents espouse. Essentially, this argument is based on the
proposition that data hacks can happen anywhere and that keeping
data physically in a particular location does not significantly lower the
chance that PI will be misappropriated, stolen, or mishandled. 105 Along
with, in the best-case scenario, a negligible increase in data security,
data localization could also result in higher costs and less data security
for businesses. For example, data localization laws significantly hinder
the benefits of modern cloud-based data storage, including increased
security and lower cost. 106 Leviathan Security Group estimates that
companies in countries that choose to impose data localization laws will
pay "30-60% more for their computing needs than if they could go
outside the country's borders." 107 Additionally, data that is stored on
multiple continents simultaneously is safer from infrastructure failure
in one particular storage location. 108
Moving beyond the increased costs to nationally contained
businesses, data localization practices necessarily impose increased
costs on businesses engaged in transborder data flow. The
102. NIGEL CORY, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS: WHERE ARE THE BARRIERS, AND WHAT

DO THEY COST? 2 (Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. ed., 2017), https://itif.org/publications/
2017/05/01/cross-border-data-flows-where-are-barriers-and-what-do-they-cost.
103. See Creemers et al., supra note 47.
104. See CORY, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 102, at 3.

105.

Id.

at 4.

106. See LEVIATHAN SEC. GRP., QUANTIFYING THE COST OF FORCED LOCALIZATION 2-3

(2015).
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 2.
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implementation of impact statements in the GDPR,109 for example,
imposes costs on firms that are required to create these statements,
ostensibly forcing these firms to hire staff, create procedures, and
cultivate expertise in this area of regulatory compliance. An empirical
study on the economic gains that could be attained from relaxing data
localization requirements for transfers between EU member countries
estimates GDP increases for member countries as high as 0. 1 8 %.11 o A
study conducted by the International Trade Commission concluded that
US GDP would increase from 0.1-0.3% in "seven digitally intensive
sectors" if digital trade barriers like data localization requirements were
removed. 111
While these empirical findings are informative, numbers and
projections lend little to our understanding of the pragmatic problems
and barriers that data localization presents. A look at Japan's APPI
provides an opportunity to examine these issues in a more tangible way.

Similar to the GDPR, the APPI does not explicitly require data
localization, but its provisions surrounding the transmission of data
could result in increased data localization and, arguably, less
economically viable trade activity. For example, an American PI
company not headquartered in California may not initially be equipped
with security infrastructure sufficient to meet APPI's standards. 112 If
the company decides that the costs of implementing sufficient
infrastructure outweigh the benefits of doing business in Japan, that
company will effectively be frozen out of the Japanese PI economy.
However, companies located in Japan will have already taken on the
costs of implementing adequate security measures since, for them, the
cost of insufficient infrastructure would be not doing business at all.
This places Japanese PI companies at a natural advantage and could
increase the amount of PI held in Japan by increasing the market share
of Japanese PI companies.

To summarize, data localization requirements impose higher costs
on both local and international businesses with the potential for
significant negative impacts on data security. In the context of the goals
espoused by the data privacy regimes in this article, data localization
requirements fundamentally misunderstand the economics of data and
are likely to be ineffective in making PI safer.

109. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 53-54.
110. MATTHAIS BAUER ET AL., UNLEASHING INTERNAL DATA FLOWS IN THE EU: AN
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF LOCALISATION MEASURES IN THE MEMBER STATES 11

(European Ctr. For Int'l Pol. Econ. eds., 2016).
111. CORY, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 102, at 8.

112. Those in California would likely have infrastructure
compliant with the CCPA, which likely meets APPI's standards.

that is anticipatorily
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Requirements for Consent
The CCPA, China's Law and Standard, the APPI, and the GDPR all
impose comprehensive requirements for businesses collecting, selling,
and processing PI to gain data-subject consent. China's Law and
Standard113 and the APPI114 require businesses to obtain continuous
consent as they process, sell, and disclose data subjects' PI. The
argument in favor of these requirements is clear cut: if the government
requires businesses to obtain explicit, ongoing consent from data
subjects, individuals will be able to better police the use of their PI over
time. Further, holding companies accountable for acquiring consent on
an ongoing basis could help improve public trust that these companies
are "processing data responsibly." 115

As with data localization, opponents of strict consent requirements
cite economic feasibility and compliance costs as potential downsides. 116
Businesses incur costs in establishing infrastructure both to obtain
consent from all data subjects and to track data collected from a
particular data subject throughout its digital life cycle. 117 For example,
when a company collects PI from data subjects in Japan, it must find a
way to attach an individual identity to each piece of data collected to
ensure the company can contact the data subject if the scope of PI use
changes. The company then must rigorously monitor the use of each of
those pieces of data and regularly compare its current use with the use
pretext under which the company originally collected it. Because of the
volume of data many multinational companies collect, they will need
robust systems in place to automatically engage with potentially
affected data subjects and reobtain their consent when that subject's
data is transferred, reused, or repurposed. This process will likely
require companies to incur substantial expenditures on infrastructure,
staff, and expertise. For small and mid-sized firms, these costs could
price them out of foreign markets completely. 118

113. Mingli, supra note 58, art. 5.3.
114. Coos, supra note 72.
115. CTR. FOR INFO. POL'Y LEADERSHIP, THE CASE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW IT
ENABLES EFFECTIVE DATA PROTECTION AND TRUST IN THE DIGITAL SOCIETY 24 (2018).
116. See MATTHAIS BAUER ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF GETTING DATA
PROTECTION RIGHT: PROTECTING PRIVACY, TRANSMITTING DATA, MOVING COMMERCE 4

(European Ctr. For Int'l Pol. Econ. ed., 2013).
117. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.135 (West 2020) (requiring businesses that must
comply with Section 1798.120 to "provide a clear and conspicuous link on the business's
Internet homepage . . . that enables a consumer . .. to opt-out of the sale of the consumer's
personal information.").
118. See CORY, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 102, at 2.
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Wide Reach
California's CCPA, China's Law and Standard, Japan's APPI, and
the EU's GDPR all reach across borders and apply to foreign businesses
that interact with their respective citizens. While these wide nets
provide increased protection to citizens who almost certainly interact
with international data collection and sales companies, they could also
impose high compliance costs on businesses around the globe.
This note proposes that California's CCPA, in part, is intended to fill
the gaps left by the US's piecemeal federal privacy regime. The US's
federalist system offers a unique, contained example of the potential
costs of geographically varied data privacy regimes. As noted above, the
CCPA applies to any company that does business in California. 119 This
means that, because of the nature of online data collection, the
businesses affected do not have to be headquartered in California or
even have any physical presence in the state. Businesses fall under the
purview of the statute as soon as they make contact with any California
citizen or their PI. If each of the fifty US states enacts laws similar to
California, with differences based on their citizens' values and the
impact on businesses in each state, data collectors and sellers will be
forced to deal with each state's laws individually. Arguably, this will
increase the costs of compliance for these businesses. 120 This may
explain, in part, why California's statute is limited to businesses that
either make a certain dollar amount per year or collect large amounts of
data from consumers. In this way, the California legislature has shifted
the financial burden of dealing with their regulations to those most able
to shoulder it-businesses that make a lot of money.
China's Law and Standard is similarly limited to large businesses,
but the international reach of the Law and Standard's jurisdiction
presents unique problems for those businesses. Specifically, data
companies are concerned about the Law's inspection requirements since
the companies may be required to disclose proprietary information to
the Chinese government in the process. 121 Further, trade associations
can request spot inspections, which raises concerns about the use of the
Law as

an improper

avenue

for competitive

underhandedness.

122

119. Id. at 2.
120. Id.
121. Wagner, supra note 51 ("The law has raised concerns among some foreign
companies over greater data controls as well as increased risks of intellectual property
theft.").
122. See id. ("Several of the provisions ...
have become a cause for concern among
foreign companies. Regarding requirements for spot-checks and certifications,
international law firms have warned that companies could be asked to provide source
code, encryption, or other crucial information for review by the authorities, increasing risk
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International data policy expert Nigel Cory pointed out that Chinese
standards, like the Standard discussed in this note, are often
characterized by government review and approval for private action and
enable the Chinese government to decide how foreign actors can
transfer data across China's borders. 123 Cory argues that China's new
regulatory scheme could have a significant impact on cross-border data
flow since China's standards historically favor domestic industry and
products. 124 Thus, while both the CCPA and the Law and Standard's
regulations pose problems from a purely administrative and
infrastructural standpoint, the Law and Standard add a threat to
intellectual property that will have to be carefully considered by
businesses interested in doing business in China. It is not out of the
question that some companies will, in the face of these concerns, opt not
to do business in China at all. On a global scale, a variety of data
privacy regimes that cast wide nets would only increase the complexity
of navigating these kinds of problems.
Users'Rights to their Own Data
The CCPA, China's Law and Standard, the APPI, and the GDPR all
grant data subjects certain rights in their PI, for example, the GDPR's
"right to be forgotten." At bottom, this proposition is based on the idea
that PI is a form of personal property to which rights attach by
operation of law. 125 In the US, property rights typically include the right
to possess, use, and dispose. 126 As a representative example, these ideas
are reflected in the GDPR's right to obtain your data from PI companies
through requests for disclosure (possess), the right to decide to whom
your data is disclosed (use), and the right to demand deletion of your PI
at any time (dispose).

These governments' decisions to grant individual rights in PI create
stark economic concerns. The costs incurred by companies to comply
with demands for deletion and disclosure alone will likely be
of this information being lost, passed on to the local competitors, or used by the authorities
themselves.").
123.

See

NIGEL CORY, THE TEN WORST DIGITAL PROTECTIONISM AND INNOVATION
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(Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. ed., 2019),
https://itif.org/publications/2019/01/28/ten-worst-digital-protectionism-and-innovationmercantilist-policies-2018.
124. Id. at 7.
125. See SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, DATA IS DIFFERENT: WHY THE WORLD NEEDS A NEW
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Governance Innovation eds., 2018).
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HOW THE WORLD'S LARGEST ECONOMIES REGULATE DATA PRIVACY

285

substantial. Companies must implement a separate infrastructure to
shoulder the costs of receiving, processing, sifting, and acting on
requests for disclosure and deletion, as they do with localization and
consent. Some firms may be forced to charge for what are now
nominally free services to offset these new compliance costs.127
Additionally, these companies will face vastly increased transaction
costs anytime they transfer data to third parties, since they will be
required to engage with data subjects to obtain consent if the scope of
the originally given consent was not sufficiently broad.
III. COMMON BENEFITS

While it is important for countries formulating data privacy regimes
to consider the broad economic impacts any particular set of policies
may have, it is also important to balance economic concerns against the
privacy and safety of citizens. By granting consumers broad rights to PI,

governments around the world are giving consumers a toolbox to protect
themselves against exploitative and dangerous data collectors and
sellers. This level of protection, albeit potentially cumbersome, is not to
be undervalued. Stories like Xu Yuyu's are, unfortunately, not unique.
As the number of citizens across the globe who connect to the internet
increases, so too does the number of potential victims of invasions of
privacy and identity theft.

This section broadly summarizes the arguments in favor of national
data privacy regimes as opposed to an international framework,
focusing on the societal benefits of nationally varied data privacy
schemes from a consumer perspective, including increased personal
privacy, the preservation and reflection of local values in data privacy
laws, and the potential for reducing illegal data flow.
PersonalPrivacy
Regions that have enacted more restrictive personal data laws
espouse their positive effects on personal privacy. The gaps in the US
federal data privacy scheme present a representative example of public
policy concerns surrounding inadequate privacy protections for data

subjects. The implementation of comprehensive privacy protections for
citizens holds companies that deal with PI accountable for their actions.
In contrast to Japan's APPI, the US federal data privacy regime does
not create a default cause of action for data subjects whose PI is lost in a
data breach. Consequently, when a breach occurs, citizens may be left
127. AARONSON, supra note 125, at 6.
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with no legal recourse. This inevitably leads to a cost shift from the
companies, which would be required under a more stringent privacy
regime to account for losing PI, to the consumers who are now at
increased risk for identity theft and its accompanying financial
consequences. 128 This is especially true for companies that do not
operate in areas that are typically regulated by federal laws like HIPAA
and the FCRA.1 29 Without a more comprehensive federal data privacy
regime, US consumers are at the mercy of some of the largest data
collectors in the world-for example, social media companies like
Facebook, search engines like Google, and online marketplaces like
Amazon.130
In light of these concerns, consumers want more protection. 131 This
desire for protection is based partially on the potential financial
consequences of a breach, 132 but it is also rooted in the fact that data

collectors can reach into data subjects' lives in intimate ways through
predictive analysis. 133 Programs like the CCPA, China's Law and
Standard, APPI, and GDPR provide safeguards in response to these
concerns through their instillation of consumer rights and requirements
that data companies disclose the purposes for data collection as a
prerequisite to obtaining consent from data subjects. As lawmakers
across the world consider the contours of their own countries' data
privacy schemes, the economic impact of any given regulation should be
balanced against the costs, both financial and emotional, to consumers
that follow from inadequate personal privacy protections.
PreservingLocal Values
National data privacy schemes allow national sovereigns to reflect
their constituencies' policy preferences and values. Different cultures
value different aspects and facets of privacy. With ever-increasing global
use of the internet by both consumers and industrial players, the ability
of governments to enact the will of their constituencies becomes
increasingly important.
128. SeeReforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-dataprotection.
129. See Carol Li, Note, A Repeated Call for Omnibus Federal Cybersecurity Law, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2211, 2213-15 (2019).
130. Id. at 2214.
131. Id. at 2212.
132. Id. (explaining the average cost of each record stolen or lost in a data breach is
$148).
133. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress PredictivePrivacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV 93, 94-95 (2014).
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In economic commentaries on data privacy regimes, this perspective

is often left out. Although economic concerns are always important to
consider, so are the unique positions of national governments and the
citizens they oversee. As discussed above, California's passing of the
CCPA provides a strong example of this principle at work. While the
US's lack of comprehensive federal regulation may be due in part to the
slow-moving federal legislature, it may also be due to a lack of countrywide pressure from citizens on federal representatives to pass
comprehensive data privacy legislation. California, through its ballot
initiative mechanism, was able to examine the values of its citizens and
enact a data privacy law that mirrored those values. However, the rest
of the country may not share these views. Other states have the same
authority to pass laws similar to the CCPA, but none have done so to
date. Applying this principle globally, a focus on nationally-held values
and traditions may put a considerable barrier in the way of unified
global data privacy governance. It is likely that sovereigns will want
continued control over how their citizens' data is collected, analyzed,
and sold so as not to betray their citizens' interests to the interests of
international business.
There is, however, an issue with the accuracy of these reflections in
countries that do not highly value the democratic process and that may
enact data laws to further national economic interests ahead of the
interests of their citizens. For example, China's Law and Standard, as
discussed above, have been the subject of criticism based on the Chinese
government's ability to use the regulations to disadvantage foreign
firms and procure proprietary security information. When countries
pass laws that focus more on state interests than the interests and
values of their citizens, the citizens will likely suffer from decreased
foreign firm interaction in their country. China's Great Firewalldesigned to keep politically harmful information out of the hands of end
users-presents a good example. While the firewall's protection against
foreign "bad actors" does in some sense make citizens safer, citizens are
also harmed by their lack of access to globally disseminated
information.
Reducing Illegal DataFlow
Illegal activity is an ever-present concern with unregulated
international data flow. Some commentators call for deep levels of
interoperability between national and international law enforcement to
ensure that data flow stays open and efficient for law enforcement
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purposes. 134 Inefficiency, jurisdictional confusion and disagreement, and
"data havens" have caused consternation in investigations of
international financial institutions, child pornography distribution, and
online human trafficking rings. 135 Interoperability in national data
privacy regimes could help both international and domestic law
enforcement agencies more efficiently pursue criminals who move data
across borders.
Data localization naturally presents a barrier to efficient law
enforcement by providing digital "lockboxes" to criminals savvy enough
to transfer their data into countries with high borders around data. For
example, a criminal enterprise in the US could move illegal data onto a
Chinese server. If US law enforcement, in the course of an investigation,
attempts to obtain the data, it is likely that, at minimum, the
requirements in China's Law and Standard's requirements for security
infrastructure verification and institutional spot checks would slow the
data transfer process. By the time US law enforcement officers got their
hands on the data they were looking for, the trail may well have gone
cold. Interoperability and an application of Prime Minister Abe's
principles of trust in data flow internationally, especially in the context
of illegal data, could go a long way to making this process run more
smoothly.
These arguments meet considerable opposition, however, from
commentators concerned about foreign government access to domestic
citizens' PI. Using China's Law and Standard again as an example,
there are already concerns about opportunities for abuse by Chinese
industry in enabling trade associations to request investigations into
foreign firms' security infrastructure. It follows that countries with
motives contrary to the principle of upholding the law internationally
could use open international law enforcement channels to illicitly gather
data on other countries' citizens.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

This section presents a brief overview of potential solutions to the
economic and social challenges global data privacy regimes present.
These suggestions are meant to be succinct, and any one of them could
be (and have been) the subject of their own dedicated academic writing.

134. CORY ET AL., supra note 69, at 14-15.
135. Id. at 18-19.
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InternationalFrameworks
Some commentators call for international frameworks that would
promote more uniform data governance, exceptions from strict
regulatory schemes for certain kinds of data, and interoperability in
data regulation schemes in law enforcement.1 36 An internationally
agreed-upon scheme has obvious benefits, particularly for multinational
businesses. Compliance costs would be much lower for multinational
firms that only have to deal with implementing sufficient infrastructure
to deal with one unified data privacy framework. 137 A unified framework
would remedy issues with, for example, GDPR and APPI requirements
for third-party security infrastructure. It would save businesses money
on things like impact statements, which would be unnecessary if the
globe's data privacy regulations were standardized. Finally, an
international framework could include specific, expedited data transfer
provisions for national and international law enforcement, with
safeguards against misuse of law enforcement channels for illicit foreign
data collection.
The drawback is that these kinds of agreements are notoriously
difficult to negotiate, fraught with political posturing, and historically
lacking in enforcement mechanisms. As evidenced by the world's
attempts to decide on a global governance regime for climate change,
data presents a similar global governance problem. As discussed above,
citizens across the world value privacy differently. Sovereigns want to
reflect those values while promoting their own national industrial and
economic growth. Some, like California, lean on the side of the citizens'
values, while others, like China, lean on the side of state interests.
These differing values, morals, and goals will likely stymie any attempts
at broad international frameworks in the near term.
Limits on or Avoidance of Data Localization
Data localization presents one of the largest hurdles to the free flow
of data internationally. It not only presents problems from a consumer
and industrial perspective, but also might not actually increase privacy
protections in countries that implement it. As noted above, the physical
location of data does not necessarily improve its safety. Hackers and
identity thieves exist in every country in the world, and they will access
data stored in one country as readily as they will access data stored in
another. In short, data localization imposes costs on foreign businesses
136. See id. at 6.
137. See CORY, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 102, at 11.
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attempting to interact economically with countries with data
localization requirements and on citizens in countries with high data
borders who cannot access the full breadth of information the global
internet provides.
Exceptions for Health Research Data
A major argument for the free flow of data focuses on health-based
innovation. The idea is, if health-related data were widely available,
research institutions and industrial pharmaceutical companies would
have more to work with when developing solutions to the world's health
problems. The ever-present individual privacy concern rears its head
here perhaps more than anywhere else, however, because citizens across
the globe place a high value on the privacy of their health-related
information. HIPAA presents a good working example of the public
policy concerns surrounding the privacy of health data because it
requires stringent security measures and de-identification practices
surrounding health data's transfer.
In the end, a robust interoperable international system for sharing
health information in a standardized format (similar to that proposed
for law enforcement in this note) could provide benefits with the use of
encryption and anonymization to reduce public information disclosure
concerns. As with illegal international data investigations, health data
could cause concern about foreign meddling in individuals' health data
for nefarious purposes. International agreements to trade health data
with efficient safeguards and restrictions could shore up many of these
concerns through thorough third-party recipient vetting, purposeful
disclosure requirements (like those contained in the GDPR and APPI),
and consent requirements for companies that wish to transfer patients'
health data internationally.
Continuing with Business as Usual
International data governance is international trade governance.
While our international commodity trade scheme is far from perfect,
historically, trade between countries has continued except in times of
heightened international strife and disagreement. As data flow
continues to become more integral to international business, countries
and companies will be forced to confront problems with varied
international schemes head on.
Arguably, the weight of the cost of international data compliance is
best left with large, multinational companies that can afford it. This
argument is reflected in the provisions in the CCPA and China's Law
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and Standard that set minimum requirements for the level of business
and data activity that companies must meet for these laws to apply to
them. By shifting the burdens of compliance to companies that can best
afford them, these laws accomplish two goals: first, consumers are not
left with the costs of data breaches and vulnerability in the storage and
transfer of their PI and, second, small and mid-sized firms are still able
to participate in foreign data trade and transfer without being priced
out by stringent compliance requirements.

Based on the economic reality that many strict data privacy regimes
will have negative economic impacts on national economies, it follows
that large businesses in these economies will eventually be incentivized
to work together to create comprehensive compliance packages to deal
with varying national standards. Eventually, after the dust settles,
dealing with data trade regulations will take the same form as dealing
with international trade regulations: though potentially costly and
sometimes cumbersome, a necessary and palatable expense of doing
business.
CONCLUSION

There is a wide range of influences on international data
governance. On the whole, a system that protects personal data,
preserves national security, and promotes the free flow of industrial and
innovative data could be in reach. Through a combination of increased
interoperability for international law enforcement, minimization of data
localization provisions, and provisions requiring businesses to be a
certain size before data privacy laws affect them, governments could
achieve a tenuous balance between privacy and economic growth.
While this process will be aided by international cooperation, the
process may be best left alone at the international level. The incentives
for nationally-contained data governance laws are too strong for anyone
to predict with any confidence whether countries will choose a globally
standardized privacy framework over enacting their own specific legal
frameworks. While this may present problems in the short term, firms
will inevitably grow and change to accommodate new data privacy laws
and, in the end, we will be left with a global data privacy regime that
reflects local values, encourages responsible business growth and
innovation, and provides consumers and data subjects with more robust
protections and the peace of mind that comes with them.

